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et al.: Domestic Law

DOMESTIC LAW

I. MENTAL DISABILITY: A DEFENSE TO DIVORCE GROUNDED
ON ADULTERY AND TO ALIMONY BAR

Rutherford v. Rutherford' presented the novel questions of whether a
mental disability constitutes a defense to at-fault grounds for divorce, and if
so, what degree of mental incapacity the defense requires.2 The South
Carolina Supreme Court recognized mental disability as a defense both to
adultery and to the bar of alimony for adulterous spouses, if the spouse
claiming the mental incapacity was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
the conduct at the time the adultery was committed. 3 Furthermore, the spouse
asserting the mental incapacity defense must prove the required. incapacity by
a preponderance of the evidence. 4
Bobby Rutherford commenced this divorce action against his wife, Carol
Rutherford, on the ground of adultery. Mr. Rutherford also claimed that the
alleged adultery barred his wife from receiving alimony. Mrs. Rutherford
counterclaimed for support and maintenance. At trial, Mrs. Rutherford denied
the adultery occurred, but claimed that even if it did, her mental incapacity
absolved her of any responsibility. 5
Mrs. Rutherford's psychiatrist testified that Mrs. Rutherford suffered from
multiple personality disorder ("MPD"). MPD typically occurs in persons who
were severely abused as children as a way for the person's mind to cope with
the abuse.6 Dr. Larry Nelson, the psychiatrist, analogized MPD to a
television set; even though it receives programs on other channels, you can
watch only one channel at a time.7 With MPD, the brain's different channels
each possess a distinct set of memories. 8 Dr. Nelson stated that generally
persons afflicted with MPD cannot switch the personalities at will.9 The
actions occurring while the person manifests a certain personality are generally
the voluntary acts of that particular personality, but not necessarily the
voluntary acts of the primary personality.'0

1. 307 S.C. 199, 414 S.E.2d 157 (1992).
2. Id. at 205, 414 S.E.2d at 160.
3. Id. at 206, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 201, 414 S.E.2d at 158-59.
6. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 201-02 & n.1, 414 S.E.2d at 159 & n.1 (citing COLIN A. Ross,
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS,

CLINICAL FEATURES AND TREATMENT 2

(1989)).
7. Record at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. at 15-17. Dr. Nelson stated that Carol Rutherford was the primary personality. Id.
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The family court disallowed Mr. Rutherford's petition for divorce.
Although Mr. Rutherford presented evidence that proved the physical act of
adultery, the judge concluded that Mrs. Rutherford suffered from a mental
disability and therefore lacked the mental capacity to control her actions.
The family court judge divided the marital2 property and awarded Mrs.
Rutherford separate maintenance and support.'
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the family
court's order.13 The appellate court found that Mrs. Rutherford failed to
prove that one of her alter egos committed the adultery, rather than herself as
a cognitive person. Because slhe failed to prove her inability to control both
her transformation into the various personalities and her alter personality at the
time she committed adultery, the court concluded that Mrs. Rutherford
committed adultery. 4
Mrs. Rutherford filed for a rehearing, arguing that South Carolina Code
section 14-3-3205 limited the court of appeals' review of the facts to a
substantial evidence standard. The court of appeals allowed the rehearing and
found that the statute violated Article V, Section 5 of the South Carolina
Constitution, which empowers the supreme court to review findings of fact in
equity cases. 16 Despite lowering the evidentiary burden of proof to a
preponderance of the evidence, the court held that Mrs. Rutherford failed to
meet even that burden. 7
Mrs. Rutherford successfully petitioned the supreme court for a writ of
certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.'" On certiorari the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that "to avoid [Mr. Rutherford's] action for
divorce on the ground of adultery and the bar of alimony, [Mrs. Rutherford]
bore the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that at the

at 17.
11. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 202, 414 S.E.2d at 159. The judge found that Mrs. Rutherford
.was under the control of one of her alter personalities" when she committed the adultery. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. This section provides the following:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only in cases of chancery, and
in such appeals they shall review the findings of fact as well as the law, except in
chancery cases when the facts are settled by a jury and the verdict not set aside;
provided, that in cases which arise out of the Family Court, except those cases
dealing with juvenile misconduct, review by the Supreme Court of the findings of fact
of the Family Court shall be limited to a determination of whether or not there is
substantial evidence to sustain such facts.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
16. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 203-04, 414 S.E.2d at 159-60 (citing S.C. CONsr. art. V, § 5).
17. Id. at 202-03, 414 S.E.2d at 159.
18. Id. at 203, 414 S.E.2d at 159.
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time she committed adultery, she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of her conduct."19 Because the court first articulated this standard at this
time, it found the record inadequate to determine whether Mrs. Rutherford
possessed the ability to understand the wrongfulness of her adultery.2"
Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case. 2'
Rather than discussing whether or not mental illness should provide a
defense to at-fault grounds for divorce and the bar of alimony, the supreme
court focused on the standard a defendant must meet to employ the defense
The court found a review of other jurisdictions' laws
successfully.'
inconsistent and unilluminating.? Some courts reject mental illness as a
Those jurisdictions that
defense to at-fault divorce actions entirely.
The South Carolina
recognize the defense apply various standards.'
Supreme Court borrowed the standard set forth in Rutherford from criminal
law.2 6 Criminal defendants incur no responsibility for a crime if they
"lack[ed] the capacity to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or legal
wrong or to recognize the particular act charged as morally or legally wrong"
because of a mental defect at the time of the crime.27 The court reasoned
that this same standard should apply to mental incapacity in divorce actions
and to the mental incapacity required to avoid the statutory bar of alimony. 28
The court relied on the South Carolina criminal statute that authorizes the
conviction and incarceration of persons who are incapable of conforming their
actions to the law.29
Mrs. Rutherford argued that South Carolina Code section 14-3-3201o
limited the supreme court's review of the family court's findings of fact to a

19. Id. at 206, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
20. Id.
21. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 206, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
22. Id. at 205-06, 414 S.E.2d at 160-61.
23. Id. at 205, 414 S.E.2d at 160.
24. Id. (citing Pajak v. Pajak, 437 N.E.2d 1138 (N.Y. 1982)).
25. Id. at 205, 414 S.E.2d at 160-61 (citing Eppling v. Eppling, 537 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct.
App.), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 619 (La. 1989); Hoehn v. Hoehn, 418 N.E.2d 648 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1981); Simpson v. Simpson, 716 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1986)).
26. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 205-06, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1992). Mental illness is an
affirmative defense. Id.
28. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 205-06, 414 S.E.2d at 161. In adopting this standard, the court
rejected Mrs. Rutherford's argument that she should not be held responsible for her actions per
se because of her inability to control the acts of her various personalities. Id.
29. Id. at 205, 414 S.E.2d at 161 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992))..
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also supra note 14 for the
text of the statute.
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substantial evidence standard. Mrs. Rutherford claimed that this statute did
not conflict with Article V, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution,
which empowers the supreme court to review findings of fact in equity cases,
because the statute merely defined the scope of appellate review without
denying appellate courts the authority to review the facts. 32 The court
rejected this argument, finding the statute "clearly in conflict with the
constitutional mandate of Article V, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution." 33 The court relied on the interpretation of this constitutional provision
set forth in Finley v. Cartwrigh 4 and consistently applied to all equity cases
since Finley,35 stating the following:
In Finley, Justice Jones... declared, "it may now be regarded as settled
that this court may reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court [in a case
of equity] when the appellant satisfies this court that the preponderance of
the evidence is against the finding of the circuit court. "36
The court also rejected Mrs. Rutherford's argument that Article V, Section 4
of the South Carolina Constitution supported her interpretation of the
statute. 37 This section provides: "Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme
Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure in all . . .
courts." 38 The supreme court found that this general provision did not
overrule the specific language of section 5, and affirmed the court of appeals,
ruling that "[iun appeals from all equity actions including those from the
Family Court, the appellate court has authority to find facts in accordance with
its own view of the preponderance of evidence.""
Finally, the court addressed an informal support agreement's effect on the
statutory bar of alimony for adulterous spouses.40 Mrs. Rutherford relied on

31. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 204, 414 S.E.2d at 160.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 55 S.C 198, 33 S.E. 359 (1899).
35. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 203, 414 S.E.2d at 160 (citing Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307,
384 S.E.2d 715 (1989); Forester v. Forester, 226 S.C. 311, 85 S.E.2d 187 (1954); Wise v.
Wise, 60 S.C. 426, 38 S.E. 794 (1901)).
36. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Finley, 55 S.C. at 202, 33 S.E. at 360-61).
37. Id. at 204, 414 S.E.2d at 160.

38. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.

39. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 204, 414 S.E.2d at 160.
40. This argument will not arise in future cases because of an amendment to the South
Carolina Code, applying to actions filed after November 29, 1990, which requires a written
agreement to override the statutory bar of alimony for adulterous spouses. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 207 & n.4, 414 S.E.2d
at 161-62 & n.4.
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Sattler v. Sattler4' in contending that the oral agreement should override the
statutory bar for adulterous spouses. Sattler allowed a formal, written
settlement agreement to override the statutory bar of alimony for adulterous
spouses, but the court declined to extend Sattler to an "informal verbal [sic]
understanding.'42
The supreme court in Rutherford faced the difficult task of articulating a
test that would provide adequate protection for persons who are mentally ill
as well as discourage promiscuous behavior in marriage.43 The test adopted
by the South Carolina Supreme Court-requiring that spouses seeking to avoid
a divorce on the ground of adultery must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that they were unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the adultery
at the time it was committed-will likely evolve into a battle of the experts in
court. Each side will present medical experts with conflicting opinions of
whether the spouse could appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct (at that
time). With the new test set forth in Rutherford, the supreme court has, in
effect, told the experts what to say; therefore, the credibility of the experts
will be a determinative factor. The experts testifying for spouse seeking a
divorce faces a unique problem because the expert may testify that the spouse
claiming mental incapacity was able to appreciate legal and moral right from
wrong at the time of the expert's examination; however, the spouse claiming
mental incapacity can assert that, though possessing that capacity now, the
spouse did not possess it at the time of the adultery." The battle-of-theexperts scenario makes it difficult for spouses to claim mental incapacity as a
defense to at-fault grounds for divorce without an expert's testimony that they
were unable to distinguish right from wrong. The Rutherford test guides this
expert testimony required for the spouse to successfully defend against the
divorce and the statutory bar of alimony.
MPD presents unique difficulties in complying with the Rutherford test.
Because of the existence of different personalities, some personalities could
conceivably possess the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
particular conduct, while other personalities may not possess this capacity.
Therefore, to determine whether the spouse was mentally incapable the court
must know which personality emerged at the time of the adultery. Although
the expert may testify as to which personalities exhibit the required mental
capacity, the question of which personality committed the adultery will often
remain unknown. The adulterous behavior leaves unanswered questions

41. 284 S.C. 422, 327 S.E.2d 71 (1985).
42. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 207, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
43. See Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949) (discussing South Carolina's
public policy of protecting marriage).
44. Mr. Rutherford's counsel faced a similar problem because Dr. Nelson testified that despite
her MPD, Mrs. Rutherford could competently testify at trial and did not need a guardian ad
litem. Record at 17-18.
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because of the lack of witnesses. The courts will face a unique difficulty when
presented with testimony that an alter personality knew the difference between
right and wrong, but the spouse's main personality did not. These particular
complications may not arise with other mental illnesses which do not involve
distinct and multiple personalities.
Because the supreme court phrased the question presented as "whether a
mental disability is a defense to at-fault grounds for divorce and what degree
of mental impairment is required,"' the Rutherford test presumably applies
to other at-fault grounds for divorce as well. In South Carolina, "[flault
grounds for divorce include: adultery, desertion, physical cruelty, and habitual
drunkenness."46 Spouses defending a divorce for one of these grounds also
need expert testimony regarding their capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of the conduct in question, and, arguably, the credibility of the experts'
testimony would determine the outcome. This implied requisite expert
examination and testimony provides a means for the court to guard against
possible abuses by persons who unjustifiably claim mental incapacity. The
court will likely consider testimony from an expert who examined the spouse
after the alleged conduct occurred. However, if the spouse is under an
expert's care at the time of the questionable conduct, the spouse's ability to
satisfy the test may improve because the expert's testimony will prove the
seriousness of the illness at the time.
The approaches taken by other jurisdictions concerning mental incapacity
as a defense to at-fault grounds for divorce vary. Three general views exist
regarding whether a defendant's insanity provides a defense to a divorce action
on grounds other than insanity.47 One view maintains that "an insane person

cannot be accountable for the consequences of his acts, since he is not capable
of differentiating right from wrong, or, if so capable, he is acting by force of
an irresistible impulse generated by a diseased mind, and not by volition."48
This view comports with the view of the criminal law." Many of the courts
that recognize insanity as a defense to divorce do not set a particular standard
for the degree of insanity required to constitute the defense. A second group
of jurisdictions recognize insanity as a defense to divorce and set specific
standards regarding the required degree of insanity the defendant must
prove.5" Yet a third approach wholly rejects insanity as a defense to at-fault

45. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 205, 414 S.E.2d at 160 (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 205 n.3, 414 S.E.2d at 160 n.3 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op.
1985)).
47. P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Insanityas Affecting Right to Divorce orSeparationon Other
Grounds, 19 A.L.R.2D 144 (1951).
48. Id. at 147.
49. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also supra note 26-29
.and accompanying text.
50. Vartanian, supra note 47, at 147-48.
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divorce, finding the defendant's mental capacity immaterial.5" Few American
courts accept this third approach.52
Examples of the varying approaches taken by other jurisdictions are as
follows: A New York court recognized an insanity defense to a divorce action
based on adultery, but found it unnecessary to choose a standard defining the
required level of mental incapacity to constitute a defense.53 However, the
New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize mental illness as a defense
54
to a divorce action brought on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal recognized mental illness as a defense to a
divorce action based on cruel treatment, holding that the spouse claiming the
mental illness bears the burden of proving that mental illness caused the mental
cruelty inflicted." The Tennessee Supreme Court held that spouses asserting
insanity as a defense to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman
treatment must prove that at the time of such conduct and as a result of the
mental illness, they lacked the capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness
of their conduct or the volition to control their acts.5" The Pennsylvania
Superior Court allowed insanity as a defense to a divorce action on the ground
of adultery, when at the time of the adultery the defendant did not know the
nature and consequences of the wrongful acts or possess the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong.57 A survey of various states' views
demonstrates that no uniform approach exists regarding whether mental illness
constitutes a defense to an at-fault divorce and what degree of mental illness
the defendant must prove.58
In Rutherford the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its power to
reverse findings of fact by the circuit courts in equity cases when it is satisfied
that the circuit court's finding was against the preponderance of the evidence
59
by declaring South Carolina Code section 14-3-320 unconstitutional.
Second, the court declined to allow an "informal verbal [sic] understanding"
to override the statutory bar of alimony for adulterous spouses.60 Finally, the
court decided the level of mental incapacity required to constitute a defense to

51. Id. at 148.
52. Id.
53. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 236 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
54. Pajak v. Pajak, 437 N.E.2d 1138 (N.Y. 1982).
55. Eppling v. Eppling, 537 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 619 (La.
1989).
56. Simpson v. Simpson, 716 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1986).
57. Manley v. Manley, 164 A.2d 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
58. For a discussion of insanity as a defense to a divorce action, see David P. Chapus,
Annotation, Insanity as Defense to Divorce or SeparationSuit-Post-1950Cases,67 A.L.R4TH
277 (1989).
59. Rutherford, 307 S.C. at 203-04, 414 S.E.2d at 159-60.
60. Id. at 206-07, 414 S.E.2d at 161-62.
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a divorce grounded in adultery or to a bar of alimony. 6 The supreme court
held that the defendant "bore the burden of proving by the preponderance of
the evidence that at the time she committed adultery, she was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.'62 In requiring the spouse who
alleges mental incapacity to bear the burden of proof, the court retreats
somewhat from its strong public policy of fostering the marital institution and
protecting mentally ill spouses as set forth in Shaw v. Shaw.63 However, the
standard announced by the court seems sufficiently restrictive to ensure that
only those spouses who present expert testimony substantiating their mental
incapacity claim will sustain the burden of the Rutherford mental incapacity
standard.
Elizabeth Ann Loadholt

II. COURT APPLIES DEFINITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
In McClerin v. McClerin' the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's holding that marital property included the amount by which
business stock, acquired prior to the marriage, increased in value during the
marriage. 2 Both the trial court and the court of appeals found evidence
showing that Mrs. McClerin (respondent) contributed to the increased value
of the stock. 3 However, neither court addressed Mr. McClerin's (appellant's)
contention that the entire value of the stock was his separate property because
Mrs. McClerin was a paid employee of his business, and because her salary
greatly exceeded the value of her services. 4 By ignoring Mr. McClerin's
argument on appeal, the court implicitly, but effectively, nullified a line of
South Carolina decisions suggesting that wages are relevant in judicial
determinations of whether the appreciated value of nonmarital property should
be deemed "marital" for purposes of equitable distribution.5
Richard and Peggy McClerin married on August 15, 1980 and separated
in September of 1988.6 On May 2, 1989, Mrs. McClerin filed for a divorce.

61. Id. at 205-06, 414 S.E.2d at 160-61.
62. Id. at 206, 414 S.E.2d at 161.
63. 256 S.C. 453, 455, 182 S.E.2d 865, 865 (1971) (citing Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502,

56 S.E.2d 330 (1949)); see also supra note 43.
i.

__ S.C.
, 425 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. Id. at _,425 S.E.2d at 477-78.
3. Id. at __, 425 S.E.2d at 478.
4. Brief of Appellant at 4-7.
5. See cases cited infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
6. McClerin, _ S.C. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 477.
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The divorce decree included a fifty-fifty division of all marital property
between the parties, including the amount by which Mr. McClerin's separately
owned business stock increased in value during the marriage. 7 The trial court
valued the increase at $1,645,698, reflecting the total value of the stock when
the marital litigation commenced, less $195,000 for the premarital value of the
stock and other assets Mr. McClerin owned prior to the inarriage. 8
On appeal, Mr. McClerin argued that the trial court erroneously included
the increased stock value in the marital estate because Mrs. McClerin received
a highly inflated salary as an employee of R-M Industries. 9 Consequently,
asserted Mr. McClerin, her overcompensated position did not increase the
value of the stock."0 Without expressly addressing this argument, the court
of appeals held that, pursuant to the South Carolina Equitable Apportionment
of Marital Property Act (the "Act")," the trial court properly classified the
stock's increase in value as marital property subject to equitable distribution
because the value increased as a result of Mrs. McClerin's efforts in the
business. 2
Although "family court[s] may use any reasonable means to effectuate an
equitable division" of property upon marital dissolution, 3 the statutory
mandate of section 20-7-473 tempers this broad grant of discretion by
subjecting only "marital" property to equitable distribution. 4 Section 20-7473 defines marital property as follows:
[A]U real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties
during the marriage and which is owned as of the date of filing or

7. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 477-78. The trial court found that only the increasedvalue of
the stock, not the stock itself, was marital property. Record at 5. The South Carolina Equitable
Apportionment of Marital Property Act specifically prohibits the equitable distribution of property
acquired by the parties prior to the marriage, unless the property falls within the exception in
§ 20-7-473(2). S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
425 S.E.2d at 478. Mr. McClerin incorporated R-M
8. McClerin, - S.C. at _,
Industries, a chemical manufacturing company, in 1977. Id. at _, 425 S.E.2d at 477.
9. Brief of Appellant at 4-6.
10. Id. Mr. McClerin asserted that Mrs. McClerin "earned from $38,000 to $60,000 per year
...when a reasonable salary would have been $30,000 per year." Id. at 4-5. The trial court
agreed that her salary was "inflated." Record at 8. The trial court, however, did not discuss the
implications of Mrs. McClerin's "inflated" salary. Had the trial court done so, it might have
concluded that Mrs. McClerin's overcompensation (relative to the actual value of her skills)
disproportionately decreased the value of the business.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
425 S.E.2d at 478; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 200-7-473(5)
12. McClerin, __ S.C. at _,
(Law. Co-op. Supp 1992).
13. Brandi v. Brandi, 302 S.C. 353, 357-58, 396 S.E.2d 124, 126 (Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam) (citing Bass v. Bass, 285 S.C. 178, 328 S.E.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1985)).
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (providing that courts lack
authority to apportion nonmarital property).
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commencement of marital litigation ... regardless of how legal title is
held, except the following, which constitute nonmarital property:
(2) property acquired by either party before the marriage...
(5) any increase in value in nonmarital property, except to the extent
that the increase resulted directly or indirectly from efforts of the other
spouse during marriage.15

Still, even the Act's definition of marital property allows the court broad
discretion. The Act offers little legislative guidance as to what constitutes an
"effort" which results in an "increase" in the value of nonmarital property.
The party claiming an equitable interest in disputed property carries the
burden of proving that the property is part of the marital estate. 6 The court
of appeals found that Mrs. McClerin met the requisite burden of proof by
demonstrating various direct and indirect contributions to the increase in value
of Mr. McClerin's stock.' 7 The court based its conclusion on Mrs.

15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The McClerin court declined
to apply a literal interpretation of § 20-7-473. The trial court found that "[b]oth parties made an
equal contribution to the acquisition, preservation, and appreciation in the value of marital
property and R-M Industries." Record at 6. Section 20-7-473 provides that the increase in value
of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of the other spouse may be included in the
marital estate. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). A methodical
application of § 20-7-473(5) in McClerin would have included only the amount of increase
attributable to the wife's efforts in the marital estate alone. However, the court of appeals
expanded § 20-7-473(5) by reasoning that although both parties made active contribution, the
entire amount of the increase should be included. McClerin,

__

S.C. at __,

425 S.E.2d at 478.

The court's expansive reading of § 20-7-473 is not inconsistent with other South Carolina
decisions applying the section. See, e.g., Crawford v. Crawford, 301 S.C. 476, 392 S.E.2d 675
(Ct. App. 1990) (holding that property deemed outside of the marital estate by virtue of a marital
property settlement agreement and a subsequent reconciliation agreement could be reapportioned
to the extent that it had increased in value due to the joint efforts of the parties).
16. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 294, 372 S.E.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App. 1988) (creating
a rebuttable presumption that property either acquired prior to marriage or within a statutory
exception remains separate property) cert. denied, 298 S.C. 117, 378 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
17. McClerin, _

S.C. at _,

425 S.E.2d at 478. The court of appeals relied heavily on

the facts as determined by the trial court. As evidence of Mrs. McClerin's contributions to the
increased value of Mr. McClerin's stock, the trial court found the following:
Through joint efforts, [the McClerins] built [R-M Industries] into a profitable
business. The Plaintiff [Mrs. McClerin] was with the Defendant [Mr. McClerin] at
the inception of R-M Industries, Inc. She has worked side by side with the Defendant
in building the company to its present state. The Plaintiff held the position of
Comptroller General and ran the administrative side of the business to include
handling a vast majority of the financial matters, running the office, and assisting in
the day-to-day operations of the business.. Although in the latter years of the
marriage she opened Financial Data Services and split her time between there and
R-M Industries, it is specifically noted that she continued to do work after hours and
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McClerin's performance of her duties as an employee of R-M Industries. On
its face the court's reasoning seems without fault; however, the court failed to
consider Mrs. McClerin's salary as a mitigating factor in classifying the
increase as marital property.
The McClerin decision proves particularly troublesome because rather
than expressly rejecting Mr. McClerin's contention that his wife's "inflated"
salary offset any interest claimed in the appreciated value of the stock, the
court simply declined to discuss the issue. Arguably, had the court of appeals
considered Mrs. McClerin's salary, it might have reversed, rather than
affirmed, the trial court's holding. Pre-McClerin decisions indicate that the
equity principals espoused in McClerin arise from a lack of adequate
compensation for spousal efforts which increased the value of nonnarital
property.
In Webber v. Webber 8 the court of appeals confronted issues similar to
those issues found in McClerin. "Mrs. Webber contributed to the business by
working as an employee; however, the evidence does not show her contribution was material. She did not contribute funds to start the business. Nor did
she contribute very much uncompensated service to the business."' 9
Accordingly, the Webber court concluded that Mrs. Webber was not entitled
to an interest in her husband's business.20 The court seemed to reason that
Mrs. Webber's salary offset any increase in the value of the company which
occurred as a result of her employment. Webber seems to preclude the type
of dual compensation for one spouse's services to the other spouse's
nonmarital business that occurred in McClerin.
Similarly, pre-McClerin cases, dealing with uncompensated or undercompensated contributions by one spouse to the increased value of the other
spouse's nonmarital business or property, consistently held that the increases
were marital, and thus, subject to judicial apportionment. 2' These cases

on weekends at R-M Industries. While she was at FDS, she was also working on
R-M Industries' matters. In addition to her work at R-M Industries she and the
Defendant entertained clients of R-M Industries in a social and home setting. The
parties devoted a substantial majority of their marriage, both social and working to
making R-M Industries into the profitable state it is in now.
Record at 7.
13. 285 S.C. 425, 330 S.E.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1985).
19. Id. at 429, 330 S.E.2d at 81 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Webber was decided
prior to June 13, 1986, the effective date of the South Carolina Equitable Apportionment of
Marital Property Act.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978)(holding that because
wife worked for husband's business for only $25 per week, she was entitled to a special equity
upon dissolution of the marriage); Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App.
1984)(holding that because wife materially contributed to husband's business by working as an
uncompensated employee, she was entitled to an equitable interest in the business upon dissolution
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clearly follow the "partnership theory" embodied in equitable distribution
statutes.' McClerin, however, seems to depart from this line of reasoning.
The McClerin court did not consider Mrs. McClerin's salary as even a
relevant, let alone determinative, factor in its decision to include the stock
value increase in the marital estate.
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the McClerin decision is the
credence it lends to criticisms that South Carolina family courts enjoy virtually
unlimited discretion to narrow, broaden, define, or even decline to apply the
operations of the Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act as
established in prior decisions. Although some discrepancy is unavoidable in
domestic cases because of the fact-specific nature of many family court
decisions, McClerin illustrates the unpredictable outcome of those equitable
apportionment cases that appear to fall within the established parameters of
prior case law. The McClerin decision raises uncertainties as to whether
established parameters even exist for purposes of equitable distribution in
domestic cases, and if they do, whether they will serve as boundaries to the
trial court's discretion.
The McClerin decision, by virtue of omission, does not directly challenge
the continuing validity of prior decisions. However, it would seem imprudent
for marital parties to rely on the holdings of cases such as Webber to limit the
authority of trial courts to include the increased value of separate property in
equitable property divisions.
Adrianne L. Turner

of the marriage).
22. See Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 372 S.E.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,
298 S.C. 117, 378 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
The doctrine of equitable distribution is based on a recognition that marriage is,
among other things, an economic partnership. Upon dissolution of the marriage,
property acquired during the marriage should be divided and distributed in a manner
which fairly reflects each spouse's contribution to its acquisition, regardless of which
spouse holds legal title.
Id. at 293, 372 S.E.2d at 109-10 (citing Walker v. Walker, 295 S.C. 286, 368 S.E.2d 89 (Ct.
App. 1988)).
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